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Even if we extend the period of the American Revolution from the beginning 
of the conflict between Great Britain and the North American colonies in the 
mid 1760s to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 the term „democracy" was 
rarely utilized. The Declaration of Independence of 1776 did underline the 
equality of human beings, the source of sovereignty in the people and the right 
of the people to change their governments - all elements of any democratic 
ideology. In addition, in the triad of life, liberty and property as inalienable 
rights, the last had been substituted by the pursuit of happiness; the declassing 
of property could seem to indicate that a defined majority - another central 
concept of democratic ideology - had the possibility of regulating it. 1 
Quite clearly, from the beginnings of the conflict with Great Britain the 
representative assemblies of the several colonies had been greatly strengthened 
and their having posed the question of sovereignty did imply something about 
the rights of a majority, here too. And yet, the real content of the classic Whig 
concept of sovereignty residing exclusively in the people would only become 
vital after fighting had begun and after alongside home rule, it also came into 
discussion who should rule at home. 
If a general definition of democracy, not specifically rooted in a specific 
epoch, could be that of self-government through majority rule it would be 
impossible to describe any of the colonies on the eve of the Revolution with 
that qualification. Existing charters limited suffrage, those who could vote did 
1 For a study of the various drafts of the Declaration see Julian Boyd, ed., The Papers of 
Thomas Jefferson, Princeton, N.J. 1950, vol. 1, 413- 433. 
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so viva voce and those who they could elect were not the sole arbiters of the 
process of government; nor did those who ruled believe in anything that could 
be called democracy.2 The social structure was evidently more fluid than in 
Europe but the political elite in all colonies recruited itself from the social and 
economic elite and everywhere it was accepted that property had a special right 
tobe protected from majorities, usually through an upper house. That the elite 
also ruled through a combination of deference from the masses and a necessity 
to listen to their voice when they occasionally rioted changes the situation but 
little. Not surprisingly, as the revolutionary crisis mounted and a breach with 
Britain seemed likely, preoccupations, especially of the merchant elite in the 
North, towards the concept of popular sovereignty, were increasingly felt. 3 
As a tendency and a concern democracy was in the air but up to the 1790s 
in America the term generally indicated an abstract form of government. One 
could, of course, find its use in a pejorative sense as in the words of a British 
official's report in 1760 which spoke of how „under forms of a democratic 
government, all mortifying distinction of rank are lost in common equality; 
and ... the ways of wealth and preferment are alike open to all men." lt would , 
in fact, only be in the last decade of the century that those fighting against 
the political and economic outlook of Hamilton and Washington during the 
first governments under the new Constitution, who had originally referred to 
themselves as republicans, would accept the designation, assigned with derision, 
of „democrats"; only then would their political associations take on the name 
of „Democratic-Republican Societies" .4 
2 The thesis of Robert E. Brown that Massachusetts was a already a democracy before 
independence (Middle Class Democracy and the Revolution in Massachusetts, 1691- 1780, 
lthaca, New York 1955) has been widely criticized although it is true that between 50 percent 
and 90 percent of the adult male population in the various counties did have the right to 
vote. For the social background to the political history of the period a good starting point is 
Jackson Turner Main, The Social Structure of Revolutionary America, Princeton, N.J. 1965. 
3 On this point see Arthur Meier Schlesinger, Thc Colonial Merchants and the American 
Revolution 1763- 1776, New York 1918; and for the general questions dealt with in this article 
Merril Jensen, Democracy and the American Revolution, in : Huntington Library Quarter-
ly 10, n . 4 (August 1957), 321- 341. 
4 Quoted in Richard Hofstadter, America at 1750. A Social Portrait, New York 1971, 
141; for a documentation on the use of this term in the 1790s see Philip S . Foner, edited 
with an introduction by, The Democratic-Republican Societies, 1790- 1800. A Documentary 
Sourcebook of Constitutions, Declarations, Addresses, Resolutions , and Toasts , London 1976. 
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Before that, following Aristotle, democracy was almost exclusively used 
as a „neutral" description alongside that of monarchy and aristocracy. In the 
classic Whig formulation each of these forms of government were considered 
to have specific positive qualities: monarchy, order and energy symbolizing 
the authority of the state; aristocracy, the wisdom from inherited wealth and 
status, and democracy, honesty or goodness based on numbers and productivity 
as well as the promotion of liberty and individual expression. If however, left 
to itself, each of them tended to degenerate due to a search for exclusive 
power: monarchy into despostism, aristocracy into oligarchy and democracy 
into anarchy or mobocracy. The job of political theory and praxis was to find 
the correct balance and mixture in these various forms; according to many, in 
Britain and North America such a mixture had been found in the unwritten 
British constitution through the combination of Crown, Lords and Commons, 
formally sanctioned by the Glorious Revolution of 1688-89. Before the 1790s 
these terms were then, with the exception of monarchy, not part of common 
speech but rather „political scientists' words, tools of analysis, closely defined, 
dry in connotation, and without emotional impact." 5 
Yet before and during the Revolution, as will be seen, a democratic 
ideology can be identified even if the word was rarely used. Although connected 
to the mainstream Whig ideology of the American elite it was something 
different. lt should be immediately noted, however, in order to understand 
better the context in which democratic ideas developed, that research of the 
last twenty-five years has indicated that this Whig ideology can no langer 
be described as unilaterally Lockean with its emphasis on the inalienable 
right to life, liberty and property as well as that of resistance to any 
government which no langer guaranteed them (given that this was the only 
reason for which governments had come into being) nor as being uniquely 
rooted in Saxon and English history. 6 A vigorous case has been made for 
5 R .R . Palmer, The Age of Democratic Revolution. A Political History of Europe and 
America, 1760- 1800, vol. 1: The Challenge, Princeton, N.J. 1959, 14. The first edition of 
the Encyclopedia Britannica, published from 1768 to 1771, similarly defined democracy 
as „popular government where power is in the hands of the people." For a panorama on 
the use of the term see Jens A. Christophersen, The Meaning of „Democracy" as used in 
European ldeologies from the French to the Russian Revolution. An Historical Study in 
Political Language, Oslo 1966. 
6 Carl Becker, The Dcclaration of Independence. A Study in the History of Political Ideas, 
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the presence - if not dominance - in the American elite of an alternative 
source of revolutionary thinking: the tradition of civic humanism going back to 
Aristotle, Machiavelli and Harrington and developing from the English country 
ideology of theorists like Bolingbroke. Here liberty meant, as opposed to the 
legal protection of individual rights in the Lockean tradition, the active and 
disinterested participation in public life in constant battle against the tendency 
of corruption. 7 
lt is true that aside from The Federalist, the collection of essays written 
in 1787-8 in defense of the ratification of the new Constitution, the Revolution 
produced no greatly significant theoretical text on the level of The Social 
Contract or State and Revolution. Despite this, democratic thought can be 
documented through countless resolutions of farmer and artisan groups, those 
New York 1922, is a classic statement of this position . Although property itself was an 
inalienable right, specific pieces of property could of course be alienated in the market with 
the consent of the owner; thus taxation, property taken from individuals by the government, 
was legitimate if surrended through consent of owners or their representative in parliament . 
On the way history - including Saxon and British history - was used by eighteenth-century 
revolutionaries see H. Trevor Colbourn, The Lamp of Experience. Whig History and the 
Intellectual Origins of the American Revolution, Chapel Hili, N .C . 1965. 
7 Bernard Bailyn, The ldeological Origins of the American Revolution, Cambridge, Mass. 
1967; Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776- 1787, Chapel 
Hili, N .C. 1969; J .G .A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment. Florentine Political Thought 
and the Atlantic Republican Tradition, Princeton, N .J. 1975, are the influential texts 
which have developed this position while Caroline Robbins, The Eighteenth-Century 
Commonwealthman. Studies in the Transmission , Development and Circumstance of English 
Liberal Thought from the Restoration of Charles II until the War with the Thirteen Colonies, 
Cambridge, Mass. 1961 , has been extremely important in understanding its sources. The 
centrality of the Lockean strain has recently been reemphasized by Joyce Appelby, Capitalism 
and a New Social Order. The Republican Vision of the l 790s, New York 1984, and Isaac 
Kramnick, Republicanism and Bourgeois Radicalism. Political Ideology in Late Eighteenth-
Century England and America, Hhaca, N .Y. 1990. While some members of the elite have been 
claimed by both - and for Jelferson , Garry Wills (Inventing America. Jefferson's Declaration 
of lndependence, New York 1978) has underlined still another influence in the Scottish 
Enlightenment - the two sides of the debate have often referred to different protagonists of the 
Revolution. Given the syncretic capabilities of human beings, including those who read widely, 
it would not be surprising that elements of these various and at times contradictory strains 
could be documented in any number of American revolutionaries; all provided „frames of 
reference" or „modes of discourse" which could be utilized for the psychological and material 
• needs feit by both individuals and classes. 
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of town or county meetings and other legislative organs as well as scores 
of newspaper articles, the formulations of what Elisha Douglass has called 
„ the village Hampdens and Sidneys". 8 Moreover, for both their influence and 
capacity to enunciate doctrine clearly one can rely on Tom Paine's Common 
Sense as well as the less known pamphlet The People the Best Governors, or, a 
Plan of Government founded on the Just Principles of Natural Freedom, both 
published in 1776. The former was not only a torrent of verbal abuse against 
the institution of monarchy and a panegyric on what America represented 
to the world. Paine's republic was democratic, connotated with unicameral 
legislative supremacy, equal representation, broad suffrage, frequent elections 
and a general faith in the capacities of the people for self-government. The 
People the Best Governors not only evidences these same positions but opposes 
all property qualifications for electors and elected and denies that money could 
be „an essential qualification in the rulers of a free people". 9 
8 Elisha P. Douglass, Rebels and Democrats. The Struggle for Equal Political Rights and 
Majority Rule During the American Revolution, New York 1955, 213. Many of the resolutions 
have been published in American Archives, 4th and 5th series, 9 vols., Washington 1837- 1853, 
or in individual state editions of the papers of the revolutionary period . 
9 Tom Paine, Common Sense, Harmondsworth, Eng. 1976, 96- 97, 109. In his defense 
of the 1776 democratic Constitution of Pennsylvania Paine came to oppose all property 
qualifications for suffrage as incapable of determining the value of a citizen (The Complete 
Writings of Thomas Paine, collected and edited by Philip S. Foner, New York 1945, vol. 
II , 277- 302) . Paine's The Rights of Man, published in 1791-92 in defense of the French 
Revolution, was probably more influential on democratic ideas but appeared too late to have 
an effect on the period here indicated. (For the importance of Part Two in this regard see 
Gary Kates, From Liberalism to Radicalism: Tom Paine's Rights of Man, in: Journal of the 
History of Ideas, vol. L, n.4, Oct- Dec 1989, 569- 587 .) Extremely revealing is an unpublished 
letter of Paine to Jefferson in 1787 on the distinction between natural and civil rights (in 
Boyd, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 13, 4- 5). Essential for understanding Paine 's 
connection with America are Eric Foner, Tom Paine and Revolutionary America, New York 
1976, which underlines the effect that America had on the Anglo-American revolutionary 
and his connection with a specific social milieu and Jack P. Greene, Paine, America, and 
the ,Modernization' of Political Consciousness, in: Political Science Quarterly, vol. 93, n. 
1 (Spring 1978), 73- 92, on Paine's role in mobilizing !arge segments of society previously 
politically inert and in desacralizing the traditional political order. As to The People the 
Best Govemors, it was reprinted as an appendix to Frederick Chase, A History of Dartmouth 
College and the Town of Hanover, New Hampshire, Cambridge, Mass. 1891 , 654- 663. 
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To the Whig doctrine of sovereignty residing in the people, democratic 
thought added that of an effective rule by the majority in all political decisions. 
lt amplified the desire of the True or Old Whigs for a government more 
responsive to the people as well as their suspicion that money could subvert such 
a principle. Democrats however, in addition, showed a natural preference for 
simple government without the complex balancing and separation of powers on 
the British model and an insistence on actual representation rather than virtual, 
i.e. that the elected should as nearly as possible reflect their electors. Moreover 
they maintained that government was intended not only to protect liberty but 
also to help the majority which had elected it; and while at least some forms of 
property were certainly to be defended by government, an upper house based 
on property was not convincing to them at all. Although Gordon Wood shuns 
the word democracy for this desire of the masses for more directly controlled 
government preferring the expression „radical extensions of Whiggism", a case 
can thus be made for such a body of thought as distinct from the ideology of 
the revolutionary elite. 10 
Few in the revolutionary elite would not have described themselves as 
republicans; most, however, were frightened at the implications of the word 
„democracy". Even when the words were used synonymously they conjured up 
different images: in the words of Bailyn, while „republic" was associated with 
„the positive features of the Commonwealth era and marked the triumph of 
virtue and reason", ,,democracy" was generally associated with the threat of 
civil disorder and the early assumption of power by a dictator. 11 To Adams 
and Hamilton, among others - but not Jefferson whose more nuanced positions 
will be referred to further on - the people (or the masses or the majority) 
simply did not appear capable of self-government although it was not denied 
that they were the source of sovereignty. lncapable of the Spartan self-denying 
virtue necessary in a true democracy they simply did not have the education 
- and wealth - to take into consideration both the complexity of situations as 
well as the implications for the general interest as opposed to mere immediate 
interests. Moreover their eyes could wander on what they just might consider 
the excess property of the well-born; chaos would result and a tyrant would 
arise. 
10 Wood, op. cit., 372. For the ideas of the True or Old Whigs see Robbins, op. cit., chapter l. 
11 Bailyn, op. cit., 282. 
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Not surprisingly fear of the masses brought many of the revolutionary elite 
far from the previously indicated classic Whig demands for a representative 
government close to those in which sovereignty was supposedly based. The 
more conservative republicans spoke against the <langer of „parliamentary 
tyranny" and „ unrestrained popular assemblies" counterpoising to them „ true 
balanced government". John Adams' diary entries from the 1760s are filled 
with such fears; he was willing in fact to award the title „republic" to any 
state which evidenced „an empire of laws and not men". His Thoughts on 
Government was a direct response to Common Sense and strongly defended 
balanced government as a way also of moderating the class struggle between rich 
and poor. Revealing the gloomy strain of New England thinking he confronted 
what for him was the depravity of human nature and the resultant propensity 
of liberty to run to license and concluded that checks and balances had to 
be written into any stable plan of government. Not really a direct defender of 
the wealthy he was continually disappointed by his unsuccessful search for a 
„natural aristocracy" in America which should not consist simply of those with 
the best natural endowments „but rather of those who combined high abilities 
with high birth, advantageous wealth, and a general superiority of upbringing 
and training" .12 At least three specific questions connected to how democratic 
theory related to and extended Whig ideology can be identified. The first was 
the question of representation. Often a distinction was made among American 
revolutionaries - for example by James Madison in The Federalist, n. 51 -
between a democracy or popular government and a republic where the first 
was limited to direct democracy, that is of a government of all over all with 
no distinction between the rulers and the ruled. If a republic was considered 
to be any state where government was dedicated to the common or public 
good, a true democracy could only exist in very small states, those where 
for practical reasons all could be present. Representatives were then perhaps 
necessary but did they represent their constituents or the entire nation? What 
was their exact relationship to their electors? Democrats supported electors 
being able to „instruct" their representatives, that is, to give them binding 
orders on how to vote. To quote Douglass „the crux of the matter was whether 
representative government would be merely a simple means of transforming 
12 Douglass, op. cit., 276. On Adams' constitutional thought see J .R. Pole, Political 
Representation in England and the Origins of the American Republic, Berkeley 1966, 314-
322. 
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the will of constituent majorities into law, or whether it would be a complex 
mechanism, weighted with checks and balances in such a way as to block unwise 
or unjust action on the part of these majorities or of any groups or individuals 
whose wills ran counter to the general welfare. "13 
A second question was that of property and its connection with citizenship. 
The Whig canon insisted that all rulers derived their power from the people 
and thus sovereignty resided in the legislature. But as J. R. Pole has so well put 
it: ,,Affirmations of the supremacy of the legislative power were neither novel 
nor daring until one decided precisely where that power was to lodge." Not 
only Montesquieu and Blackstone but even the most radical Whigs - following 
the Levellers in the English Civil War - excluded from citizenship and thus 
the right to vote not only those on public assistance but all dependent workers 
since they no longer possessed „a will of their own" or had „a stake in society". 
In the specific context of the American social structure how were property 
qualifications for the passive and active electorate to be defined?14 Morevoer, 
since the government was thought to act on either persons or property many 
Whigs supported a legislature with two houses, each representing one of these 
categories. As already noted, democrats opposed this but what limits, if any, 
did they think could be placed on property itself? 
Lastly, there was the question of the use of governmental power. In 
traditional Whig thought, the latter and liberty tended to exclude one another; 
an involvement in public affairs, motivated or not by the spirit of civic 
humanism, did not mean approval of strong government action in favor of 
specific classes or groups. What then was the correct use of sovereignty once it 
was located in the people and then derivately in the legislature? What should 
13 Douglass, op. cit ., viii. 
14 Pole, op. cit ., 19. C.8. Macpherson's brillant study, The Political Theory of Possessive 
lndividualism. Hobbes to Locke, London 1962, has underlined with vigor and consistency the 
marketplace mentality, derived from Locke but even sharper in the thought of Hobbes, which 
so dominated the radical liberalism of the the seventeeth and eighteenth centuries. That the 
Levellers wished to exclude all wage earners - as Macpherson contended - has however been 
contested by Roger Ilowell, Jr . and David E. Brewster, Reconsidering the Levellers. The 
Evidence of The Moderate, in : Past and Present, vol. LVI (February 1970), 68- 86. 
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a constitution - written or unwritten - prevent or allow the people or the 
representatives to do?15 
Connected to this was the concept of the separation of powers which was 
itself subject to various interpretations. For the Whig canon it was synonymous 
with mixed or balanced government - monarchy, Lords, Commons - and was 
to avoid the accumulation of power. This interpretation more or less inspired 
the Constitution of 1787 where the American Whigs felt the necessity of 
strengthening the federal government: the separation of powers there became 
the interpenetration of powers where for functions like law making, treaties and 
impeachment the concourse of more than one brauch of government (legislature, 
executive, judiciary) was necessary. For the democratic impulse in the United 
States of the 1770s and 1780s, separation of powers meant instead an end to 
plural office holding and thus a limit to the power of the elite which tended 
to monopolize, often in the same person, several functions (representative, 
councillor, judge, sheriff, etc.). 
The presence of a distinct democratic strain does not mean that it went 
beyond the general bourgeois character of the American Revolution. As with 
the Whig elite the problems it dealt with were almost always connected with 
rights derived from property; such property was in general considered inviolable 
as well as part of a legitimate market mechanism although at times democrats 
did speak against an unbridled laissez-faire attitude. Most adult white males 
possessed property but no coordinated body of thought spoke for those without 
it to say nothing of those deprived of all civil rights within the society ( the mass 
of slaves essential for production in the South and the adult females everywhere 
essential for reproduction) or those on its margins but subjected to it (the 
Indians). 
Despite these limits, even before the battles of the 1790s carried on by 
the followers of Jefferson, one can document for the preceding two decades not 
only debate on the essential questions of democracy but also a direct attempt 
during the Revolution to make the weight of the people, that is to say the adult 
white males, felt in the formation of the new political society. 
In fact, during the period of the American Revolution democracy, much 
more than a question of political theory, was an actual impulse from below of 
15 On the naturally encroaching nature of power for eighteenth-century Whig thought, see 
the perceptive summary by Bailyn, op. cit., 55- 60. 
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individuals or groups who demanded participation in government as well as 
something specific on a material level from the institutions. Such a democratic 
urge did not for example ask abstractly whether and in what cases the interests, 
alliances and ambitions of a closed aristocracy would mean a domination of 
private considerations in political choices instead of public good, but rather 
reasoned from its life conditions and its interests asking instead what had been 
and would be the practical effects of one form of government or another. The 
discussion took place not in a vacuum but closely linked to a specific historical 
and social situation quite different from that in which Whig thought matured 
in England and not only because America lacked a hereditary aristocracy. 
Developing during a revolution it had the urgency of the Levellers rather than 
the meditative rhythm of those Elizabethans who read Gasparo Contarini's 
disquisitions on the balance and stability of Venetian rule or the gentlemen 
of mid-18th century England who read James Burgh on the relations between 
electors and the Commons. 
How successful the democratic ideas developed in Common Sense and 
in The People the Best Governors actually were can be seen in the State 
Constitutions drawn up after the collapse of royal power in the individual 
colonies. This was the battleground which would demonstrate whether the elite 
which had seized total sovereignty from Britain would be capable of maintaining 
its predominance. Despite sharp battles in North Carolina, Massachusetts and 
Pennsylvania and a temporary victory in the latter, the elite held firm and 
the constitutions which passed, despite generally weak executives, followed 
rather closely the recommendations of John Adams: bicameral legislatures and 
suffrage based on some amount of property with still higher requirements for 
elected office were everywhere present. 
The writing of these Constitutions was not the first time that the 
„normal" political process in North America was influenced by the people. Mass 
political activity including extra legal mob action was a constant factor in the 
18th century colonies; if however it was able to influence public policy it was 
usually manipulated by one faction or another of the elite. 16 The difference in 
the 1770s and 1780s was not only the greater focusing on questions of political 
16 Influenced primarily by the English historians Edward P. Thompson and Eric Hobsbawm, 
scholars have studied the ideological outlook of the colonial mob finding both consciously 
political as weil as pre-modern elements. See Jesse Lemish, Jack Tar in the Streets: Merchant 
Seamen in the Politics of Revolutionary America, in: William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Series, 
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democracy but that now this political involvement, especially in that of the 
states mentioned, was connected to the writing of the fundamental law.17 
In North Carolina the struggle was a continuation of the violent conflict 
of the Regulator agitation in the late l 760s and early l 770s which pitted the 
yeoman farmers of the Piedmont against the Tidewater gentlemen planters. 
The latter had monopolized not only representative government but also the 
judicial system which they turned to their own benefit; conflict moreover was 
exacerbated by the increasing wealth of the planters. The many riots which 
periodically blocked the court system finally erupted into something less than a 
full scale battle at Alamance in 1771 where the Regulators were defeated by the 
militia with several killed on both sides. Not surprisingly, continuing opposition 
to the Whig elite which had begun to contest royal authority brought many 
of the Regulators to either neutrality or pro-Tory sympathies. Nonetheless the 
rebellious spirit of the previous period could be clearly seen when in 1776 the 
farmers of Mecklenburg and Orange counties drew up instructions for their 
representatives to the constitutional convention. These instructions, with the 
clear request for a „simple Democracy" under their direct control, are some 
of the most important documents of the grass roots democratic surge of this 
period: not only is the „principal power" located in the people but government 
is defined as derivative of this, exercised „by the servants which they employ". 
In Massachusetts the fulcrum of the democratic movement were the 
farmers of the western part of the state and the artisans of Boston. Given 
the presence of the established Congregationalist church demands for complete 
religious freedom, voiced most directly by Isaac Backus, were a part of it. 
The struggle of the democratic forces had a more solid theoretical basis - The 
People the Best Governors was published in this state - and the opposition to 
property qualifications was more closely reasoned; it is not without importance 
that some even objected to denying the right to vote to free blacks and Indians. 
The entire Whig leadership was hostile to this democratic program: not only 
vol. V, n. 3 (July 1968), 371- 407; Pauline Maier, Popular Uprisings and Civil Authority in 
Eighteenth-Century America, in: William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Series, vol. XVII, n .l 
(January 1970), 3- 35; Gary B. Nash, The Transformation of Urban Politics, 1700- 1765, in : 
Journal of American History, vol. LX, n. 3 (Oecember 1973) , 605- 632; and Dirk Herder, 
Crowd Action in Revolutionary Massachusetts 1765- 1780, New York 1977. 
17 For the struggles over the state constitutions see Douglass, op. cit ., 233- 286; Jensen, op. 
cit., 334- 338; Wood, op. cit ., 226- 237, 244- 250 ; and E. Foner, op. cit., 107- 144 . 
M . S y I v e,. : Am er i ca n Re v o I u t i o n, 31-52 ÖZG 3/1991 41 
42 
John Adams, the main influence in the 1780 Constitution, but also his cousin 
Sam, radical mostly in the sense of being willing to mobilize the lower dass for 
the battle against Britain. 
The movement in Pennsylvania was the only one crowned with success 
in that the 1776 Constitution - substituted however in 1790 - practically 
eliminated property qualifications for voting and office holding; moreover, not 
only was the legislative body unicameral but there was also a mechanism for 
submitting laws to the public before being passed by the representatives. The 
social base for this victory was once again farmers from the western part of the 
state - equally interested, however, in fighting the Indians as the elite - and the 
Philadelphia artisans and workers with whom Paine was in contact. Their task 
was rendered easier by divisions and Toryism among the traditional leadership 
and by certain democratic elements already present in the colonial charter. The 
main argument presented in Pennsylvania for the extension of suffrage was the 
impossbility of denying it to all those who were enrolled in the voluntary militia 
and thus prepared to defend the Revolution; reference was also made - taken 
from True Whig ideology - to the supposedly pure Saxon type of government 
dose to the people which was considered to be part of the British heritage. 
The general spirit of those who battled for democracy could be summed up 
by a sentence from The People the Be:it Governor:i: ,,The people know best their 
own wants and necessities, and therefore are best able to rule themselves." Or, 
to quote a petition of New York mechanics in 1776, the people at large are „the 
sole lawful legislature" and their task was nothing less than to take back the 
power - in the form of a simple unbalanced direct representational system - that 
had previously been delegated. What came to be challenged was a hierarchical 
view of society which had, up to the outbreak of the Revolution, been more or 
less accepted. The democratic sentiments had a distinct dass base, at least in 
the sense that they often spoke of rich and poor. Democracy was not an abstract 
ideal. Government existed not only to protect liberties ( as in Whig ideology) 
and was not only an abstract symbol of majority rule: there is evidence, as 
with the price control movement among at least apart of the Philadelphia lower 
dasses, that government was understood as having a responsibility to help those 
from whom - the majority - power had been delegated. The radical democratic 
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push thus clearly distinguished itself from civic humanism and country ideology 
in that it was concerned with social justice and economic benefits. 18 
If however a Leveller spirit is present in this democratic movement, Diggers 
are hardly anywhere to be found: there was in fact no generalized demand of 
the democrats for the confiscation and division of large scale property. And 
yet one cannot avoid mentioning that the original draft of the Bill of füghts of 
the Pennsylvania Constitution did contain the following article: ,,An enormous 
proportion of property vested in a few individuals is dangerous to the rights, 
and destructive of the common happiness of mankind; and therefore every 
free state hath a right to discourage possession of such property." That the 
Convention struck out this passage is undoubtedly the main point; and yet the 
question had surfaced. lt was of course a fundamental intellectual weakness of 
the democratic movement that there was little reflection on why there were 
so many debtors and so strong a concentration of wealth. The latter, in fact, 
was considered by both democrats and Whigs to be a question of individual 
qualities either tobe condemned or praised but certainly not analyzed in terms 
of a „mechanism of accumulation". 
lt may well have been, as John Adams and others complained, that 
the revolutionary upheaval meant to the less fortunate in society simply the 
possibility to do as they wished and no longer be dominated by the wealthy. 
But even intended in its noblest sense, the concept of majority rule in the 
18th century was just that: the rights of the majority with no affirmation that 
this majority in liberating itself would in some way liberate the entire society. 
Moreover majority rule was essentially a political concept. In the words of 
Marx's criticism of Bruno Bauer in the next century, human emancipation was 
confused with political emancipation while the rights of the individual were 
understood to be the rights of self-interest. 
The problem of minority rights - as opposed to majority rule - was far 
less important. As to ethnic minorities - Indians and blacks - they were 
implicitly neglected by the democratic movement. The United States was 
to be a „white man's country". Slavery was important as a concept and a 
reality, first and foremost to the revolutionary elite - and not only because 
it was the economic base for an important part of it. Of course it was a 
18 Kramnick, op. cit., 204-205, has made this point with regard to the political activity of 
the artisans. 
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contradiction with the ideological tradition of the Real Whigs who, to quote 
Caroline Robbins, believed in „the natural rights of everyone everywhere", and 
the more sensitive and intelligent of the slaveholders, like Jefferson, agonized 
with this contradiction. Nor were they hypocrites as superficial criticism has 
often held: that the elite intimately knew what slavery was, encouraged its 
exponents sincerely and deeply to fear it from Britain. Moreover it gave 
them the opportunity of exercising hegemony over the white non-slaveholding 
majority through racism and through the non necessity of their subduing the 
whites as a subordinate labor force. 19 
Essential to the small white farmers of the democratic movement was the 
availability of land: colonial history is filled with incidents where democratic 
demands of the whites - as in Bacon's Rebellion in Virginia in 1675 and in 
the Paxton Boy's Massacre in Pennsylvania in 1763 - were linked with the 
desire to expell or exterminate the Indians. And if slavery was opposed, this 
was primarily because some democrats saw the slaveholding elite as a political 
enemy and the institution itself as a debasement of free labor. The elimination 
of slavery was, however, never to be followed by the construction of a bi-racial 
society; the solution here, similar to that with the Indians but opposed by 
most slaveholders for evident reasons, was deportation back to Africa precisely 
to leave America as a white man's land. The ambiguities on the racial question 
- the exclusion of Indians and blacks from the rights which were claimed for the 
whites - were for the democratic movement in America perhaps no less striking 
than those of the Leveller movement in England with regard to the dependent 
19 Robbins, op. cit., 383. On slavery and political discourse see Bailyn, op. cit., 232- 246 , 
and David Brion Davis, The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution 1770-1823, Ithaca, 
N.Y. 1975; specifically on Jefferson see Winthrop D. Jordan, White Over Black. American 
Attitudes Toward the Negro 1550- 1812, Chapel Hili, N.C. 1968, 429- 481, and John Chester 
Miller, The Wolf by the Ears. Thomas Jefferson and Slavery, New York 1977. On the centrality 
of slavery for the debate and passage of the Constitution see Staughton Lynd, Class Conflict, 
Slavcry, and the United States Constitution, Indianapolis, lnd . 1967, 135- 213 , and Lawrence 
Kaplan, The Origins of the Constitution: Thoughts on a Marxist Paradigm, in: Less than 
Perfect Union, edited by Jules Lobe!, New York 1988, 85- 90 . Edmund Morgan, American 
Slavery - American Freedom. The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia, New York 1975, has lucidly 
shown how the slavery of some was intimately linked with the freedom of others . In passing it 
might be noted that the gross underestimation of slavery by Hannah Arendt (On Revolution, 
New York 1973, 71- 72) has rendered rather dubious her positive estimation of the American 
Revolution in comparison to the French one. 
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laborers. If it cannot be sustained that such ambiguities were an element in the 
defeat of the democratic movement during the Revolution, racism was certainly 
a continuing problem for all mass movements in the next two centuries. 
In addition to the excluded races some religious minorities were also 
rejected by democratic majorities. If the Separation of Church and State was 
a constant demand, this was almost always accompanied by religious tests 
for office holding aimed primarily against Roman Catholics. The question is 
not how real the threat from Rome was, that is whether Catholicism truly 
menaced a democratic - and republican - society. Rather, having identified this 
as a genuine threat, democratic majority thought had apparently no hesitation 
about sharply limiting its right to expression. 
Even more pertinent to this distinction between liberalism and democratic 
thought is that the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 prescribed an oath of 
allegiance to it on the part of all prospective voters; it was thus permissible that 
the recently won right of the majority to rule could limit - without any spirit 
of contradiction and similar to the question of religious tests - the political 
rights of those who presumably opposed the democratic principles contained 
in this document. Liberalism or moderate Republicanism was concerned with 
protecting individual rights including those of property; democracy, on the 
other hand, was the implementation of the will of the people, that is of majority 
rule. Quite clearly the various Bills of Rights which would be affixed to most 
state constitutions as well as the federal one were in the line of liberalism, that 
is of the protection of minority rights against the power of the state, and did 
nothing for majority rights. 
The fears generated by this democratic surge surfaced rapidly and an 
offensive was mounted to block it. 20 Most of the elite believed that true merit 
was not advancing in the newly independent states and that the people were 
showing a distinct incapacity for self-government. ,,Democratic despotism" was 
leading not only to anarchy but to injustice. On a general level, Madison 
had noted that only a minority of the population was interested in protecting 
property; specifically the question was the mass of economic legislation - even 
where the democratic forces had not won the constitutional battle - which 
sought to help the poorer farmers against the wealthier merchants through the 
issuance of paper money and the erection of various barriers to the collection of 
20 For the intellectual bases of this attack see Wood, op. cit., 376- 383, 393- 467. 
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debts. Forgetting that the wealthier classes had economic projects of their own, 
selfishness and narrow-mindedness were located by the elite theorists primarily 
among the farmers. The defense of genuine republican virtue was thus identified 
by the moderates with the defense of the economic perogatives of the traditional 
economic elite. 
As might be expected, the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 was a main 
object of attack: separation of powers, a second upper house, the non-election 
of judges and their independence together with the right of judicial review 
of legislation were all thought to be necessary changes to be instituted. The 
Constitution was wrong in pretending that the state was a sort of a „simple 
Republic": Pennsylvania society possessed great distinctions and differences 
which all had a right to be protected. The Whig theory of the dangers of 
a concentration of power was quite naturally again brought into play. The 
conservative onslaught was essentially based on two propositions: firstly - and 
in this contravening much Whig reasoning - that the legislative representatives 
should not be so close to the electorate; and secondly, that the power of these 
representatives was tobe limited and specifically unable to act against the right 
of property. 
The democratic surge had managed to leave its mark on the political 
history of the country but the counteroffensive that it generated was everywhere 
victorious, also in Pennsylvania where, as noted, the Constitution was changed 
in 1790. The series of explanations advanced by Douglass for this defeat 
seem convincing enough: a lack of leadership among the democrats given 
the possibility of social advancement from below (Franklin being a perfect 
example); the fact that government itself was not seen by many a prime problem 
due to the availability of cheap or even free land; the predominantly agrarian 
character of all states which emphasized cohesion between the farmers and 
the !arge scale planters (similarities in their problem of indebtedness were 
evident); and lastly, that Whig government, although against majority rule, 
did manage to evolve forms which were somewhat responsive to the people. 21 
In addition, there persisted a feeling that the Whig leadership was necessary: 
after all, it was a popularly elected convention in Massachusetts which wrote a 
Constitution in 1780 substantially raising property qualifications for suffrage, 
a Constitution moreover ratified through a more or less correct procedure. As 
21 Douglass, op. cit., 317-319. 
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to North Carolina, it is easy to imagine the continuance of deference given that 
many of the possible supporters of a democractic movement were illiterate or 
semi-literate and thus incapable in any case of full self government. 
Yet another - and even !arger - defeat was in the offing, this time on the 
federal level. The struggle of the moderate political forces, representing large 
scale property of one sort or another, to defeat those of democracy and to 
establish what they called more stable governments - that is, less responsive 
to the immediate needs and desires of the masses - had its most dramatic 
denouement in respect to the national government. Despite the economic 
upsurge at the middle of the 1780s, a historiographical tradition has painted 
the period of the Articles of Confederation - the first federal Constitution 
adopted by the Continental Congress in 1777 and finally ratified four years 
later - as „critical": according to this view the country was descending into 
chaos and lawlessness and was thus incapable of utilizing the potential which 
had been released by the Revolution. Whether this was objectively true or not, 
certainly it was the dominant view of the elite and Shays' Rebellion in 1786 - an 
attempt of indebted farmers in western Massachusetts to stop the functioning 
of the court system which was seizing their land - only confirmed this view.22 
The American Whigs did not deny that the Republic would be an 
instrument of social mobility: self-made men would however have to rise from 
their dass and enter singly the world of educated, cultivated - and propertied 
- gentlemen. After the Revolution such a naturally differentiated aristocracy 
failed to appear and the Federalist thought behind the Constitution of 1787 -
most specifically in the writings of Madison who is the true „founding father" -
saw the people as less and less „possessing virtue in the classical sense"; this 
led to „an increasing recognition of the importance, and the legitimacy" of 
factions which would pursue not collective but particular interests , something 
rejected in True Whig thought. The constitutional device of checks and balances 
served multiple purposes: it limited the possible effects of majority rule, it 
controlled the corruption that the prevalence of this interest-oriented politics 
would normally bring and especially it would increase the capacity of the !'?Stern 
to absorb the conflicting interests which were based on varying distinctions in 
22 Merrill Jensen has strongly criticized the description of the period of the Articles as 
one of decline and chaos in : The New Nation . A History of the United States During the 
Confederation 1781- 1789, New York 1950. For Shays ' Rebellion see David P. Szatmary, Shays' 
Rebellion . The Making of an Agrarian lnsurrection , Amherst, Mass. 1980. 
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property. Moreover, such property was now better defended against both, the 
propertyless as well as any who would covet the property of others. 23 
To this, Hamilton - surely the number two „founding father" - added the 
certainty that the people would tend to make mistakes in their political choices. 
Not declassed as the source of sovereignty, the people were to exercise it only 
indirectly. Numbers, in short, would not be allowed to prevail over property 
and the people would remain at an arms length from political power. 
The net result of the drawing up of the state constitutions and the federal 
one of 1787 was thus that property had been reestablished as an order with 
specifi.c rights, a situation sanctioned by the existence everywhere - with the 
exception of Pennsylvania until its new Constitution - of an upper house. 
On the federal level the Senate had also served as a way of guaranteeing 
a form of equal representation of each state but the second chamber had a 
deeper meaning. ,,The old and feeble idea of estates had crumbled away. But 
property had risen in its place. Property, in this sense, was not a mere attribute 
of individual ownership, but was an ingredient of the social order. Property 
emerged from the confusion as a sort of independent ,estate' ." 24 
The Federalists had put through nothing less than a grandiose project: a 
Constitution for the entire country which came to be ratifi.ed by the people's 
representatives in the several states. The victory of this project - ratifi.cation 
was accomplished not primarily through fraud which did however exist - was 
through an alliance in which wide strata of the people, more artisans and 
laborers than farmers however, participated.25 Given the principles of what 
has been called the democratic movement, it is impossible not to consider the 
victory of the federal Constitution as a defeat. 
The democratic movement was defeated in terms of its objectives but it 
did have an effect on the development of the new nation. Bailyn has reminded 
us that the American Revolution was not undertaken as a social revolution in 
that no one „deliberately worked for the destruction or even the substantial 
alteration of the order of society as it had been known". And yet the extension 
23 On the Constitution and property see Pocock, op . cit., 520- 523; Wood, op. cit., 469- 564; 
and William B. Scott, In Pursuit of Happiness: American Conceptions of Property from the 
Seventeenth to the Twentieth Century, Bloomington, lnd. 1977, 44- 50. 
24 Pole, op. cit., 342. 
25 On the political tactics of the Federalists see Jackson Turner Main, The Antifederalists. 
Critics of the Constitution 1781- 1788, Chapel Hili, N.C. 1961, 187- 281. 
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of small agricultural property and an abolition of primogeniture and entail, a 
separation of church and state, a widening of suffrage, etc. were all tendencies 
pushed forward not only by the general convulsion of the Revolution and the 
war but also specifically by this democratic movement. Merrill Jensen has 
sustained that the significance of the democratic movement was „in its tendency 
to elevate the poli tical and economic status of the majori ty of the people". 26 
One can however wonder if the real significance was not the way in which the 
elements of democratization were integrated into a synthesis carried out by the 
ruling social elite thus impressing upon the nation a vision quite different from 
that of the democrats. 
The ruling elite learned during the colonial period and the Revolution to 
operate with flexibility and through the art of consensus. If the democratic 
movement helped to force this elite to understand the need for responsiveness 
to the masses, part of the genius of American politics will be the capacity of 
political leaders to absorb the shocks originating from below. In the last decade 
of the eighteenth century and the first of the following one the best example 
of this capacity was represented by Thomas Jefferson: it is not impossible to 
imagine that his relationship to the democratic movement born in the 1770s 
and 1780s was similar to that of Franklin D. Roosevelt to the upheaval of the 
nineteen thirties. The statesman and political philosopher from Virginia who 
became the leader of the „democratic-republican" movement under the new 
Constitution and was victorious in the election of 1800 was the most democratic 
of the elite in the sense of being the most open to the desires of the mass of 
small farmers and artisans as well as the one who most believed - despite his 
support for a Senate and his fears about legislative tyranny - in their capacity 
for self-government . And if Jefferson was not always convinced, as were the 
revolutionary democrats, that majority will and public welfare were the same, 
he was confident that through sound primary education and a free press one 
could have confidence in the people. 27 
26 Bailyn, op. cit., 302; Jensen, The Articles of Confederation. An Interpretation of the 
Social-constitutional Ilistory of the American Revolution 1774- 1781, Madison, Wisconsin 
1940, 15. The classic statement on the multiple social effects of the Revolution is in J. 
Franklin Jameson , The American Revolution Considered as a Social Movement, Princeton , 
N.J. 1926. 
27 The relationship of Jefferson to democracy is extremely complex. One can begin with 
Richard Hofstadter , Thomas Jefferson: the Aristocrat as Democrat, in: The American 
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The destiny and development of the democratic movement in America 
was however not only linked to and limited by the flexibility of the ruling elite: 
such a capacity was itself based on the material possibilities of the country, 
that is its natural wealth and its seemingly endless possibilities of expansion. 
In the battle over the ratification of the Constitution of 1787 the Federalist 
vision was two-pronged. On the one hand it certainly was a repudiation of 
the principles of 1776: after a period of chaos, or in any case democratic 
challenge, their Constitution represented a successful attempt - in the words 
of Wood - ,,to restore and to prolong the traditional kind of elitist influence 
in politics". They were however able to put this through because the national 
vision of the Federalists of an ever-expanding commercially oriented republic 
was able to win a substantial following: Paine, for example, supported it because 
such a government seemed best suited to the fortunes of democracy and the 
common man while others - primarily the urban artisans - were perhaps more 
prosaically convinced that such a vision of the country's development was in 
their material interest.28 The new Constitution generated a strong opposition. 
There was, however, no unified Antifederalist thinking which had in fact various 
motivations: the Antifederalists feared what a growth of national government 
would do to both liberty and local interests; they were suspicious of forms of 
representation that detached the elected ever more from their constituency and 
of forms of government ever more complex and distant; and if they were not all 
democratically oriented they did see the proposed Constitution as aristocratic 
in that it passed power from the many to the few with the consequent <langer 
to personal freedom. But specifically relevant to the question of national vision 
they were, as their opponents maintained, thinking on a smaller scale. 29 
Although the Constitution was ratified by only a narrow majority - if 
indeed there was such a majority - it would come tobe genuinely rooted in the 
Political Tradition and the Men who Made lt, New York, 1948, 18-43, and Richard K. 
Matthews, The Radical Politics of Thomas Jefferson. A Revisionist View, Lawrence, Kansas 
1984, keeping in mind however the annotation of Douglass, op. cit., 289, on the need 
to distinguish between his political praxis „ which in many respects made impossible the 
realization of his political philosophy". 
28 On Paine's developing free trade economic ideas see E. Foner, op. cit., 145- 182. 
29 On Antifederalist thought see especially the introduction to Cecilia M. Kenyon's 
anthology, The Antifederalists, Indianapolis, Ind. 1966, xi-cxvi and Herbert J. Storing, What 
the Anti-Federalists Were For, Chicago 1981. 
ÖZG 3/1991 M . S y I ver s: Am er i ca n Re v o I u t i o n , 31-52 
masses precisely because such a vision came to be more and more accepted, 
also by the small farmers, as that which offered the most: a government which 
not only protected their freedom as in the True Whig concept, but also aided 
them in their economic endeavors. In this, Jefferson was undoubtedly essential. 
His victory showed that such anational vision - which Jefferson had gradually 
adopted even before his election as president - could be held by friends of 
democracy and assured that the fruits of national development would at least be 
shared among social strata and not monopolized by those who had dominated 
the federal government in the 1790s. 30 One can sustain that the historic bloc, 
to use a Gramscian expression, already emerging among the Federalists during 
ratification - an expanding white man's republic with ample room for the 
common man - will be decisively strengthened once Jefferson has emerged 
victorious. 
The liberalism which was codified in the new Constitution and acutely 
defended by Madison in The Federalist with its emphasis on interest group 
politics instead of the common good was something quite different from the 
civic humanism of traditional country ideology. But with its accentuation of 
the representative quality of the republic, with the elected ever further from 
their electors, it was equally distant from the democratic movement. The 
perspective of an expanding commercial capitalism as the destiny of the country 
was something which would link Hamilton, Jefferson and Jackson beyond their 
different views of the capabilities of the masses and of acquisitiveness as a 
human quality. That such a perspective corresponded to a reality - the country 
would in fact be able to expand within and without over the next centuries -
is what would provide a basis of mass support for the ruling elite even among 
future wage earners, among all those, in short, who could reasonably hope that 
their material group and individual aspirations could be satisfied within the 
framework of a bourgeois system of property. 
30 A case can be made that up to the 1790s Jefferson's model of society was - to use 
Macpherson's distinctions (op. cit., 46-61) - more of a simple market society as opposed to a 
possessive market society. Once president - pushed forward by the Napoleonic wars - he also 
accepted as part of his outlook a limited industrial development despite previous strictures 
on the incompatibility of the city and healthy republicanism. Jefferson had, however, always 
favored commercial agriculture undoubtedly counting on the possibility of non-subsistence 
farmers being both acquisitive and concemed for the public good. 
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On the other hand, unless we radically redefine democracy, it is a vision 
and a reality which has little to do with that held by the previous democratic 
movement, that is the active exercise of political power by the directly interested 
masses ( even if primarily for their immediate economic interests ). In the 
political model which emerged at the end of the eighteenth century liberalism 
with its protection of the rights of the individual against the interference of 
government (and the protection of property) came to substitute democracy 
although this liberalism would function with a base of mass consensus. 
lt is quite easy to document that the tendency in the United States 
towards political passivity, especially present in the second half of the twentieth 
century, has had its basis at least partially in the new Constitution. Expanding 
authority and power of government has been accompanied by an ever more 
distant possibility of control by the people. Political power has indeed even 
passed from elected representatives - chosen by increasingly voluntarily reduced 
electorates - to executive or thoroughly independent agencies. The Real Whigs 
of the English tradition, the Antifederalists and the more democratic wing of 
the ruling elite of the eighteenth century, would, together with the American 
democrats of the revolutionary upheaval - those in short fond of stating that 
„Liberty is lost by decay of virtue, slavery is preceded by sleep" and that 
„The price of freedom is eternal vigilance" - , all feel rather uncomfortable 
in a Washington dominated by the National Security Council, the Central 
Intelligence Agency and the Federal Reserve Bank. Such considerations are 
not a mere reedition of the jeremiads of the 1600s. There is a real question 
as to what could happen to the country politically if the universally accepted 
vision of an ever expanding economy - that contained in the Constitution in 
substitituion of the democrat thought of the late 18th century - no longer 
corresponded to reality. 
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